Introduction

Nearly eighty years after the Red Army decapitated the Nazi regime in Berlin, ending their thousand-year reign one millennium early, we stand on the cusp of “a slide back into the age of authoritarianism” on a worldwide scale (Agostinone-Wilson 45). Today, fascism poses its most pervasive threat since its inception in interwar Italy (Finchelstein 743). Scholars agree that fascism emerged and reemerges in times of extreme economic, political, and social crises, and today, the global hegemonic economic system, neoliberal capitalism, has created such crisis. As will be discussed, this system enables and encourages extreme capital accumulation at the zero-sum expense of the everyday proletarian. This modern permutation of fascism presents as authoritarian populism, a response to the adverse effects of globalized neoliberalism, putting liberal democracy in existential peril. In order to effectively quash and further prevent fascism, radical remediation and restructuring of the social contract is necessary.

The first step in creating shared understanding is defining foundational terms, especially delineating between similarly situated terms as covered in this research. Neoliberalism is a form of capitalism integrated in the late 1970s that encourages upwards accumulation at the expense of state capacity via the deconstruction of the state (Cox & Skidmore-Hess 592; Joppke 1). In plain terms, the state deregulates industry and industry privatizes public state functions (Blakely 33; Joppke 1). Supported by the state, neoliberalism hinges not on the presence of “free markets”, but rather on the federally-sanctioned supremacy of capital, giving undue representation to capital within the state, making the system “distinctly ‘unfree’” (Blakely 14, 33; Cox & Skidmore-Hess 590). In its highest state, neoliberalism transforms from simply an economic system into a political system, inextricable from the democracy it parasitizes.

Populism permeates in all democracies throughout history. A reactionary response intrinsic to all liberal and social democracies, it is “merely a shadow cast by democracy itself” - but is especially pernicious and a “permanent feature” of neoliberal democracy (Joppke 1-2). Whether a style, ideology, or strategy, populist leaders dichotomize the “pure” or “true” “people” against “outsiders”, especially the “corrupt” “elite” to enact the “general will of the people” (Agostinone-Wilson 33; Ayers 415; Joppke 1). Each movement is complemented by either nationalism (right) or socialism (left), creating a “fundamental distinction” between the populist left, who oppose capital, and the populist right, who work to reinforce its supremacy (Armin; Ayers 415; Joppke 1). Populism’s alignment, however, is less important than “the leader’s cult and the demonization of opponents” (Finchelstein 744). The delineation of opponents, therefore, determine the movement’s alignment, whether gilded economic elites (left), or political elites who enable immigration and welfare (right). This research focuses exclusively on right-wing authoritarian populism because of its relative indistinction from (neo)fascism, particularly in its reinforcement of social and economic hierarchy via extreme nationalism (Agostinone-Wilson 44; Joppke 15). Fascist movements rely on populist movements to gain legitimacy within the democracy, which it then seeks to dismantle.

Thus, right-wing authoritarian populism mutates into fascism. Fascism represents “a revolt against the future” in order to return to a “mythical past” of “national greatness” (Agostinone-Wilson 33; Ayers 423; Cox & Skidmore-Hess 601). This national greatness, however, very often hinges on “white supremacy,... nationalism, militarism, chauvinism,... exclusion, [and] oppression” to regain its “lost values” before globalized neoliberalism (Agostinone-Wilson 33; Cox & Skidmore-Hess 591). Fundamental to fascism and highly relevant to its modern permutation in neoliberal democracy is “the absence of a challenge to the essential aspects of the capitalist order”, enabling neoliberalism that is “free from conflict”, which play out via “anti-producti[ve]” policies such as the suppression of labor (Agostinone- Wilson 34; Armin; Cox & Skidmore-Hess 601; Finchelstein 735). In fact, according to socialist scholars witnessing the rise of Adolf Hitler, “fascism is the political expression of monopoly capitalism itself” (Conze & Wilkinson). Thus, the lack of distinction between right-authoritarian populism and fascism, as per Joppke, where “right” is a stand-in for hierarchical economics and “authoritarian” translates to hierarchical sociocultural policies (3). Fascism emerges as the insidious evolution of right-authoritarian populism, emphasizing the need for intervention while the latter remains on the fringe.

In the West, fascism is not seen as an imminent or existential threat to democracy, its discussion relegated to the history books, defeated for good. Thus, the conditions which catalyze right-authoritarian populism are handled with “misplaced complacency”, allowing fascist rhetoric and ideology to become “normalized” and “banalized” in global politics (Ayers 416, 425). Fascism becomes an urgent threat when the economic, political, and social systems reach an “insurmountable” crisis (Agostinone-Wilson 38; Ayers 419), of which this paper argues we are in the midst. Neoliberalism has created such crises, enabled by the mainstream political parties who fail to address and often exacerbate this democratic emergency. Opportunistic populists exploit these crises and inactions, ultimately transforming into a fascist regime to exhibit power and protect the supremacy of capital.

Economic Backsliding

While debates surrounding Smithian free-market capitalism - whether it uplifts the proletariat or subjugates them - are endless, the tangible outcomes under neoliberalism are undeniable. Neoliberal economic policies have systematically decimated the Western working class, leading to widespread deskilling, wage stagnation, and worsening job prospects, resulting in economic stagnation or even decline (Ayers 422; Cox & Skidmore-Hess 599; Joppke 7). This is remarkably evident in the Rust Belt, where the process of “restructuring” global capital has outsourced blue collar manufacturing jobs to the Global South, driving down wages 12% since 2000 (Ayers 421; Cox & Skidmore-Hess 599; Joppke 8). The “misery index”, combining inflation and unemployment, has reached a 35-year high, creating a severe financial crisis for countless families (Ayers 417). These people are what Branko Milanovic calls the “proverbial losers of globalization” (Joppke 7). These concerning trends reveal the inherent deficiencies of neoliberal policies, especially globalized neoliberal policies, which prioritize capital over labor. 

The shift from FDR’s highly regulated capitalism under the New Deal to the neoliberal framework ushered in by Reagan has irrevocably shattered the social contract, leaving everyday workers behind. The World Inequality Report reveals that these policies have led to the extreme upwards wealth transfer of $47 trillion from the bottom 99% to the top 1% since the late 1970s (Ayers 422). According to economist Joseph Stiglitz, under neoliberalism “all the growth… has gone to those at the top” (Joppke 8). This report highlights the true purpose of neoliberal policy: to enrich the already exorbitantly wealthy, and further proves that neoliberalism inherently causes a crisis of “capitalist overaccumulation” but has “no ability” to uplift the proletariat (Ayers 417). This wealth siphoning is not a byproduct of meritocracy nor luck; it is the deliberate outcome of neoliberal policy at the altar of capital supremacy. 

The 2008 global financial crisis - the “doom moment” of financial capital (Joppke 8) - further exemplifies the state’s prioritization of capital. Faced with a choice between bailing out private equity or private citizens, the ostensibly pro-labor administration elected to reconstitute corporate banks in a “large-scale public subsidization” (Cox & Skidmore-Hess 595-6). This decision reinforced supply-side economics and reaffirmed the state’s commitment to capital interests, underscoring the extent to which neoliberalism intertwines the state and corporate power, reshaping the state as a mechanism for capital accumulation (Blakely 48; Conze & Wilkinson; Davies 00:20:40-54). With deliberate policy, the state cements itself as an ally to capital. The state had but no choice to enable capital in the wake of the financial crisis, as the purpose and function of the state under capitalism become “increasingly indistinguishable” from a corporation itself in order to “improve accumulation conditions” (Ayers 422; Conze & Wilkinson; Scheiring). In times of crisis, the state remunerates capital but enforces austerity on the public, cutting essential services and welfare retrenchment, shifting the burden to the proletariat and enabling further upwards wealth transfer (Ayers 422; Blakely 54; Conze & Wilkinson; Cox & Skidmore-Hess 604). The state’s role, therefore, is not diminished in favor of laissez-faire, but rather restructured as a supporting arm to facilitate capital’s needs. The 2008 financial crisis reappears throughout this essay as an inflection point in the acceleration towards neofascism (Ayers 422; Blakely 48; Cox & Skidmore-Hess 593; Joppke 8). 

Likewise, the state necessarily enables cronyism and turns a blind eye from collusion, resulting in monopoly and monopsony rather than genuine competition. Neoliberal capital tends towards “inefficiency”, not of production but of organization, consolidating capital power to their “own advantage” (Blakely 9; Davies 00:12:03-00:13:05). Conversely, neoliberal policy requires the extreme individualism of workers. Concurring with the neoliberal attacks and decimation of organized labor, proletarians become what Michel Foucault calls, “an entrepreneur of himself” (Blakely 50; Davies 00:13:50-00:15:15). In this new rat race, workers are constantly competing against each other, “charged with managing our own portfolios of assets and liabilities” - not speculative capital, but our paychecks and bills (Blakely 49). Thus, Marx’s prediction of “crony capitalism” in which capital necessarily moves toward centralization is vindicated, leaving workers exposed to “misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, [and] exploitation” (Blakely 11, 50). Austerity and abdication of the social contract has predictable outcomes, stoking “greater distrust and cynicism toward capitalist governing institutions” among the general public, “creating openings for authoritarian capitalist actors” (Cox & Skidmore-Hess 590-1, 595-6; Conze & Wilkinson). These conditions lay the groundwork for a societal shift - the self-absorbed decimation of community - where discontent becomes the playground of neofascist movements. 

The effects of these deliberate pro-capital policies are palpable and reverberate throughout the working class of the Global North. Many in the West now recognize that neoliberal globalization has utterly failed to deliver on the promise of trickle-down economics, leading many to believe that their children will never achieve the same life they had, signaling a “civilizational” shift away from “intergenerational progress” (Ayers 421; Joppke 7). The result of this discontent is concerning. In 1994, as President Clinton’s Secretary of Labor, Robert Reich predicted the logical outcome of this capitalist crisis: the proletariat “anger and… disillusionment is easily manipulated. Once unbottled, mass resentment can poison the very fabric of a society… replacing ambition with envy, replacing tolerance with hate” (Reich 00:11:35-00:12:40). Yet, though there is a “clear connection” between economic backsliding and authoritarian populist support, it is not the “main driver” (Davies 00:08:26-00:09:05; Joppke 8, 11). It cannot explain the prevalence of far-right nationalist populism, who focus their ire on globalization more than neoliberalism. To them, capitalism works just fine, if not for “evil elites”, often coded in anti-Semitic or nationalistic terms, and thus needs a “reworking, not an overthrow” of neoliberalism (Blakely 54; Cox & Skidmore-Hess 594). Thus, continued analysis, next into the complicity of the political class, is warranted.

Political Disengagement

If the answer to right-authoritarian support does not lie solely within the economic sphere, a critical analysis of the political sphere becomes necessary. The 2008 financial crisis ripples out here as well: the political policy to reconstitute banks rather than the populace reflects the neoliberal disconnect between the politicians and the people. This disconnect is further evidenced by the decline of “class-based” support for ostensibly pro-labor parties, which have shifted from advocating for workers to emphasizing social policies on diversity while colluding with the right in favor of the economic neoliberal order (Armin; Ayers 420-1; Cox & Skidmore- Hess 599-600; Joppke 2, 4-5, 9). Thus, this pro-labor party becomes instead a social democratic party. According to Joppke, this has led to a convergence of political interests where neither party represents the people, but rather become political cartels, as “colluding and self-serving parts of the state apparatus” (5). Meanwhile, the proletariat becomes unrepresented.

This disconnect further alienates the large working class, creating a “crisis of representation” that discourages political participation from voters who refuse to choose between “variations of neoliberalism” (Ayers 420). The mainstream parties, instead of diverging along the class schism, both accept globalized neoliberalism as “inevitable and beneficial” to their true technocratic interests (Davies 00:34:31-00:35:04; Joppke 4-5). The working class, previously demarcated into liberals and conservatives, disillusioned with the “dysfunctional political class” now mobilize around “a class-party for their own” (Conze & Wilkinson; Cox & Skidmore-Hess 604). In popular movements, the working class mobilize against the political class.

Thus, this new “class-party”, though reflective of a shift in political alignments, does not fall along the class schism as Conze & Wilkinson or Marx would have predicted, because neoliberalism necessarily decimates leftist pro-labor ideology from mainstream politics. Under neoliberalism, the social democratic party has willfully enabled “pasokification”, the wholesale capitulation of and retreat from leftism in favor of the “normalization” of neoliberalism, drifting ever more rightward under the new order (Agostinone-Wilson 35-6; Armin; Ayers 420; Cox & Skidmore-Hess 596; Davies 00:34:31-00:35:04; Joppke 2). Such parties have not only rolled back worker and welfare protections in favor of capital supremacy, but have adopted far-right rhetoric such as “getting tough” on crime, immigration, and government handouts (Armin; Ayers 425; Joppke 2). The result is not only the further alienation of traditional labor supporters, but the shifting of the Overton window, legitimizing far-right anti-social positions and reactionaries, who now disfavor generally accepted social diversity.

The predictable outcome of this deliberate pasokification and acquiescence to right-wing politics is the alienation of the proletariat as possible constituents. As Vermont Senator remarked following the latest example of right-authoritarian populist electoral victory, “it should come as no great surprise that a Democratic Party which has abandoned working class people would find that the working class has abandoned them” (@BernieSanders), even despite the election following a remarkably pro-labor, pro-union administration. This disconnect further highlights the complexity of the intersectionality of the authoritarian populist issue. Regardless, the disengagement of these voters has resulted in a “collapse” of working class support, leaving elections to be determined by the “multiple elites”: the high-earning, college-educated proletarian “Brahmin Left” (think tech workers) and the petite bourgeoisie small-business owning “Merchant Right” (Ayers 421; Joppke 9). This estrangement results in a legitimacy crisis not only for the mainstream political parties but for the very institutions of democracy (Cox & Skidmore-Hess 593). 

This political alienation has created a fertile ground for charismatic populists who position themselves as champions of the “common person” against the neoliberal status quo (Agostinone-Wilson 33). Philosopher Hannah Arendt, who flew Nazi Germany, posits that the catalyst for public mobilization - from “engage” to “enrage” - is “not injustice…, but hypocrisy” (Davies 00:29:56-00:30:11). This hypocrisy is evident in not only the pasokification of the left, but also in the right, who advocate for small-government laissez-faire markets until neoliberal ideology demands they enact pro-capital policy, illustrating the “naked assertion of the power of capital” (Blakely 52-3). Disengaged voters who yearn for political agency are easily swallowed up by populists who offer “a new type of working-class party” against the “political class” and liberal institutions that have become antithetical to representative democracy (Ayers 426; Cox & Skidmore-Hess 592; Davies 00:08:26-00:09:05; Joppke 3). This enraging inconsistency fuels the appeal of populist movements who cater to working class interests. 

As populist movements gain legitimacy, the traditional political class is left defending a system that has systematically excluded and alienated large swaths of the populace. Neoliberal parties on the right and the center-left have long mythologized pro-capital free market “liberties” while arguing even basic public services constitute “socialism” (Armin; Blakely 12). Likewise, social democratic parties that cater to the cosmopolitan elite, who often value “liberal democracy” over tax breaks, have abandoned the tangible concerns of the rural and suburban working class (Ayers 421; Davies 00:30:50-00:31:01; Joppke 10). Now, these parties are put on the defensive and are ill-equipped to contend against populist challengers who resonate with proletarian grievances. When faced with this reflection of their own failures, these parties revert to “bureaucratic mode”, reinforcing the same democratic institutions that the public no longer trusts and are emblematic of their own disenfranchisement (Agostinone-Wilson 38). This cycle underscores the political class’s - especially pasokified leftist parties’ - complicity in their own demise. Positioned against liberalism, populists may now confront the working class’s social sphere.

Social Status

Though the political class alienated large swaths of the proletariat, they would remain disengaged if not for charismatic leaders tapping into deep-seated insecurities. While the tangible economic hardships of the working class are a critical factor, they cannot entirely explain the breadth of populist support. This is evidenced by the mobilization of the petite bourgeoisie - small business owners and upper-middle management - who paradoxically ally with the lower proletarian class, despite their diametric economic conditions (Ayers 421; Cox & Skidmore-Hess 602; Joppke 10-1). Rather, these groups align on cultural issues, driven by a shared “relative deprivation” exacerbated by their desperation “to regain their former position” in the “social hierarchy” threatened by socially diverse neoliberalism (Ayers 422; Cox & Skidmore-Hess 600; Davies 00:21:52-00:22:29; Joppke 10-1). This deprivation is not about material loss but about status: an anxiety that pits groups against each other in a Social Darwinian zero-sum struggle for social dominance (Davies 00:16:33-41, 00:17:34-00:18:17, 00:20:02-22, 00:21:52-00:22:29). Then, perhaps, it becomes more rational that economic disdain “has remained remarkably steady” while the sociocultural wedge has “dramatically risen” since the implementation of neoliberalism (Joppke 10). Right-authoritarian populists offer reinforced social hierarchy to assuage the fear of losing one’s status.

As Secretary Reich predicted, this status anxiety is easily manipulated. First, populists borrow from both leftist pro-labor and right-nationalist vocabulary, promising to reinstate jobs that have been outsourced overseas (Agostinone-Wilson 41; Ayers 421; Joppke 2). Concurrently, they vilify “the undeserving poor” and “welfare mothers”, condemning the government that creates “privileged” “deadbeats”, especially when compared to how these groups were treated “in the recent past” (Agostinone-Wilson 39-40, 45; Cox & Skidmore-Hess 596; Davies 00:21:52- 00:22:29). To right-authoritarians, “cultural Marxism” has infiltrated and debased liberal democracy, tyrannically stealing from the “earners” to give to the political elite’s “special interest” group: the poor (Cox & Skidmore-Hess 595-7). In this sense, the populist movement sees themselves as a “silent counter-revolution” charged with restoring society from “a degraded culture” (Agostinone-Wilson 45; Joppke 4). The populist’s appeal lies in this dual strategy: stoking economic resentment while reinforcing social divisions, ultimately diverting attention from the systemic inequalities perpetuated by neoliberal policy.

One of the guiding principles of rightist ideology that permeates into authoritarian populism is the rejection of holistic systemic reform, despite the causal role capital and neoliberalism plays in societal inequality. Ideologically, right-wing politics are inherently “anti-egalitarian” and thus work to reinforce hierarchy which they believe as natural or holy, therefore compelled to “define its enemies in terms other than wealth and [economic] power” (Joppke 3). This serves in contrast to populist economic framing: the financial issues are tangible, but cannot be solved by radical economic means. Likewise, there are very complex attitudes towards wealth and capital in neoliberal nations, which helps to reveal why right-wing populists are often “extremely rich” themselves (Davies 00:24:15-25). Capitalists and rich populists are not subject to the same hypocritical calculations that politicians are: according to sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild, they make “no claim to represent anyone other than themselves” (Davies 00:32:00-55). Their immense wealth, therefore, is not a signal of the failing economic system, but rather an indicator of their cutthroat savvy. This definitional ideology and cultural baggage supersedes any possibility of meaningful but radical change, instead shifting focus from economic grievances to sociocultural discontent.

Populists require a clear enemy against whom to rally their base, and under right- authoritarian populism, this enemy is redefined through the lens of nationalism. Globalization has created new “outsider targets” - immigrants - that “contaminat[e]” society and threaten the white social order (Agostinone-Wilson 42; Ayers 424-5; Cox & Skidmore-Hess 593; Joppke 12). This has created a “crisis of white identity” (Ayers 424-5), from which populists frame globalization as the ultimate cause of societal decline. This pivot from economic concerns to nationalism is a perverse bait-and-switch tactic, using economic fear to legitimize xenophobia (Agostinone-Wilson 33). Thus, the relationship between perceived deprivation and white erasure comes to the forefront (Cox & Skidmore-Hess 593, 602; Joppke 11). This nationalist turn not only targets marginalized communities but consolidates and unifies support. This again exemplifies why the petite bourgeoisie allies with the blue collar proletariat, as both are particularly precarious under globalized neoliberalism (Cox & Skidmore-Hess 593). By framing immigrants, welfare recipients, and multiculturalism as existential threats, right-authoritarian populists avert attention from neoliberal failures and onto the globalization-enabled “Other” (Ayers 425). Populists equivocate their nationalism with socially acceptable terms such as illegal immigration and diversity in order to prime their supporters for the overt embrace of hierarchical nationalism, revealing the true face of right-authoritarian populism. 

If there is a definitive moment when right-authoritarian populism becomes fascism, it lies in the impudent embrace of racial supremacy. While right-authoritarian populists claim their motivations are not racist but “nativist” and “ethnopluralist”, espousing separate-but-equal nations “inhabited exclusively by members of the native group”, this is merely a rebranding of racial segregationist ideology (Joppke 12). To right-nationalist populists, multicultural globalization is “antithetical to… ‘freedom’” and threatens the “general will” of the people against “homogenizing universalism” of the social hierarchy (Cox & Skidmore-Hess 601; Joppke 6, 12-3). The populist does not begin with racism, instead coding racial disdain as concern for “law and order” and the importance of cultural retention, but it will always evolve into racially-charged scapegoating onto marginalized communities (Agostinone-Wilson 42; Ayers 425; Joppke 13). With this masked language slowly unshrouding, right-authoritarian populists inch closer to fascism.

Fascist Transmogrification

This research has yet to delineate between right-authoritarian populism and fascism. It is hubristic folly that the mainstream political class and public at large does not see fascist dictatorship as a possibility, when in reality, it could occur with very little notice. According to Agostinone-Wilson, to pinpoint when exactly right-authoritarian populism has transmogrified into fascism can warrant dissertation-level analysis, indicating that the threat of fascism remains well within the realm of possibility - and, perhaps, inevitability (35). Compounding the issue is the legitimization of right-authoritarian populism by mainstream media and political institutions, further enabling this dismissal of fascism, giving tactical advantage to these movements to surreptitiously accumulate support (Ayers 416; Cox & Skidmore-Hess 601). Thus, not only are the very political parties and institutions charged with protecting democracy complicit in the conditional rise of fascism, but put us further at risk by minimizing its existential and imminent threat. When it comes to defending democracy, it is better to be an active alarmist than a passive enabler. 

Right-authoritarian populism is difficult to quash before it evolves into fascism because it is an ostensibly democratic popular movement. Political scientist Nadia Urbinati documents populism as a “disfigured” form of democracy that advocates for “direct representation” - a blatant oxymoron - that seeks to install a “regime of rather than by the majority” (Joppke 6-7). This regime, unable to address the economic and social issues on which it campaigned (Ayers 419), must claim to have complete support to accomplish its true goal of power consolidation. Socialist barrister David Renton notes that populists are universally popular only “by their own definition”, who disregard and eventually suppress dissent, further leading to the widespread dehumanization of anyone regarded as “the Other” (Agostinone-Wilson 33; Ayers 425). The result, therefore, is “possessive” “illiberal democracy” - a misnomer, as democracy necessarily requires liberalism and tolerant inclusion on principle (Joppke 6-7). Populism, therefore, although popular, is inherently anti-democratic. 

The emergence of fascism from neoliberalism is rooted in the reliance on state enforcement to maintain capital supremacy. As the system begins to fail, to protect power and profit, capital has no choice but pragmatically mutate neoliberalism by supportism fascism in a “preemptory [sic] strike” against the specter - even if just hypothetical - of proletariat revolution (Ayers 419; Cox & Skidmore-Hess 593, 595; Finchelstein 739, 742; Scheiring). Capital will do anything to protect itself and its profit, up to and including “the categorical rejection of democracy” (Armin; Ayers 419). Finchelstein, however, warns against conflating fascist economics with neoliberalism, as authoritarianism inherently subverts laissez-faire competition (738, 743), yet this research has shown that neoliberalism has done that itself. Under threat, capital will seek to preserve itself, revealing why socialist scholars refer to fascism as “old capitalism writ large” (Conze & Wilkinson). Once acquiescing to the supremacy of capital, the fascist state then works to enforce it. 

The enforcement of capital’s supremacy under fascism involves a dual strategy: crushing organized labor and dismantling liberal state institutions. This is the fascist-capitalist “compromise” (Agostinone-Wilson 40; Ayers 419; Cox & Skidmore-Hess 601-2; Finchelstein 743; Scheiring). When elected, fascists continue the neoliberal mission: to “undermine, delegitimize and weaken the… regulatory capacities” of the state, further allying with capital (Ayers 421; Cox & Skidmore-Hess 601-2). Populists like Viktor Orbán in Hungary exemplify this tactic by enacting austerity measures conjunct with corporate tax cuts, making his “fiscal policy… even more neoliberal” (Scheiring). Similarly, post-1990s Latin American regimes have minimized state capacity in favor of economic vertical integration (Finchelstein 745). Likewise, fascist regimes require proletarian “submission to… the authority” of the state (Armin). As organized labor and unions inherently attempt to regain parity with capital, they are relegated to the “lower orders” of society and subject to dehumanization (Ayers 421). In the infamous poem “First They Came”, communists, socialists, and trade unionists are listed as targets of the Nazi regime before Jews (Niemöller). This research discovered near-unanimous agreement that fascist regimes systematically suppress labor (Agostinone-Wilson 39-40; Ayers 421; Conze & Wilkinson; Cox & Skidmore-Hess 591; Finchelstein 740-1; Schiering). Trotsky succinctly defined the “gist of fascism”: the frustration of “the independent crystallization of the proletariat” (Finchelstein 741). Hard-earned labor rights come to a screeching halt under fascist dictatorship to enable capitalism without conflict.

Along with labor-capital hierarchy, fascists aim to restore social hierarchy. They leverage the “relativist moral order” inherently created by neoliberalism: one’s value under capitalism “can only be gauged relative to the success and failure of others” (Davies 00:17:34-00:18:17). In working to reconstitute the social hierarchy, fascists do not define this in meritocratic terms, but rather in strict Social Darwinian definitions of “culture, nation and race” (Agostinone-Wilson 34; Ayers 425). Campaigning on a “mythical”, homogenous past in which diversity did not threaten the social order, fascists promise to “avert or reverse downwards mobility” and, through extreme nationalism, to restore “some sense of stability and security” (Ayers 422-3).This rhetoric primes supporters to take action against those they see as obstacles to social and fiscal security.

The intersection of thin-skinned leadership with moral relativism creates fertile ground for state-sanctioned violence against those deemed to be in dissent. The moral relativist nature of right-authoritarianism ordains violent “applied ethnic nationalism” against the out-group (Agostinone-Wilson 42). Perversely, the perpetrators are absolved from responsibility as acting on behalf of the civilizing mission of the regime, further dehumanizing their targets (Agostinone- Wilson 42; Ayers 425-6). Fascism does not offer “justice” but “revenge”, and violence is glorified for the sake of itself (Agostinone-Wilson 41; Conze & Wilkinson). According to Davies, the prospect of retributive violence against the foreigners - blamed for social and economic precarity - is highly appealing to fascist supporters (00:10:55-00:11:06). The regime’s supporters, in fact, want a strong and vengeful state that can enact violence to reinforce the power imbalance of the desired social hierarchy, and, quite frankly, to whom they deem to deserve it (Ayers 426; Davies 00:11:23-57). Serwer’s The Cruelty is the Point explores this phenomenon in modern contexts, illustrating how such dynamics escalate into human rights atrocities. Populist nativism becomes extreme racial nationalism under fascist leadership, state- or self-enforced by those deputized by the state, which leads to inhumane outcomes.

Despite the racial dehumanization and eugenicist practices inherent in fascism, capital remains complicit as long as profit is preserved. Agostinone-Wilson encapsulates this compromise: “German capitalism did not need Auschwitz, but it needed the Nazis, who needed Auschwitz” (39). Trotsky similarly critiques capitalist enablers of fascism, observing their willingness to align with irrational leaders in the hopes of safeguarding their own interests: “a particle of Hitler” lies within each of his supporters. However, this fascist-capitalist compromise eventually becomes untenable under the leadership of an irrational tyrant. Cox & Skidmore-Hess illustrate the “fascist contradiction”: although doing everything to reinforce the supremacy of capital, the irrational leadership often destabilizes the economy, and capital is prevented from returning to the “normalcy” of neoliberalism (605). Any attempt at returning to pre-fascist neoliberalism risks empowering labor and enabling revolutionary change. The question remains whether capital would risk such a transition to address the structural deficiencies that birthed fascism - or whether this cycle will persist.

Conclusions and Next Steps

As this critique of neoliberalism relies heavily on socialist literature, it is inherently subversive and may invite passionate dissent. While we could debate the merits of egalitarian Marxist socialism versus free-market Smithian capitalism, it is clear that neither of these is the current iteration of global economic hegemony. Therefore, this debate is wholly irrelevant to the criticisms levied against the neoliberal economic, political, and social systems today. Nevertheless, this research does not feign to give comprehensive solutions to the evolution of neoliberalism into fascism; it merely seeks to understand. However, some guiding principles to prevention of and/or surviving under fascism can be gleaned from this research. 

First, it is critical to acknowledge that this research does not provide an exhaustive analysis of the myriad social, political, and economic conditions that lead to fascism. Factors such as the internalized Protestant Work Ethic, media and social media degradation, education defunding, and foreign influence, require a more robust effort. Political scientist Sheri Berman aptly describes the issue as requiring “a variety of perspectives”, underscoring its immense complexity (Joppke 16). Similarly, Scheiring attests that current populist studies scholars focus too often on the political sphere, while neglecting the important role of the bourgeoisie elite. A full accounting of these dynamics may never be completed, and if it were, its findings would fill endless volumes.

A seemingly straightforward solution to prevent fascism is for social democratic parties to de-pasokify; that is, to shift left. This research reasserts the most salient finding: the working class is alienated by a political class that no longer represents their interests. Refuse to acquiesce to the rightward shift of the Overton window, refuse complicity in accepting high-dollar corporate sponsorship, refuse to demand perfection when offered decent. These actions, while simple in theory, require undaunted leadership and solidarity. The only way that fascism can be prevented is by the outright rejection of capitalism, accomplished by the passionate mobilization of the proletariat (Ayers 426, 428; Cox & Skidmore-Hess 598, 605). If the capitalist conditions that incubate fascism remain unaddressed, we risk playing - and losing - Whack-a-Mole with each new right-authoritarian populist. 

It seems now that in many countries, including my own, we may soon see the rapid transmogrification from populist leadership to fascist dictatorship. First, to gauge whether a state has crossed into fascism, Laurence Britt’s “The 14 Characteristics of Fascism” can serve as a diagnostic tool. Some characteristics may immediately raise red flags, but be reassured that you will not be complicit in the state’s fascist goals. Next, Masha Gessen’s Surviving Autocracy illuminates us as to just how we got here, and perhaps what to expect. Gessen fled Putin’s Russia and has spent her career studying despotism. Finally, Timothy Snyder’s On Tyranny, which details twenty lessons from the classical fascism of the 20th century, starts with an essential directive: “Do not obey in advance” (17). Fascist capabilities “are more limited than they imagined” (Agostinone-Wilson 36-7), and they often rely on uncritical compliance from their citizens (Snyder 17). Author Saladin Ahmed reminds us, “classical fascism never enjoyed a day without resistance; likewise neofascism” (Ayers 428). Resist.

If we resist, stymying fascism, the likely rebound to neoliberalism offers little comfort. In the absence of systemic transformation, survival under capitalism remains necessary. Building resilience does not require militancy. Resources such as Yugoslavian YouTuber YUGOPNIK’s “Socialist Guide to Surviving in Capitalism” provide practical advice: organize, encourage coworkers to discuss wages, and unapologetically utilize benefits. Advocacy for equitable policies and ideological representation is essential. The fight for a more just society must continue, not just as a defense against fascism, but as a proactive pursuit of dignity and security. Passivity risks enabling the fascism we seek to prevent. When workers stand together, we can literally change the world.

“For the earth to live, capitalism must die”

- Nick Estes, 2019 (Ayers 428)